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Shoshone County No. 
CV-2014-55 
Defendants-Respondents/Cross-Appellants. 
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The Honorable Benjamin R. Simpson, District Judge, Presiding 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Following entry of a stipulated final Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, from which neither 
party took an appeal, the District Court tried Washington Federal's singular remaining claim which 
sought entry of a deficiency judgment against Hulsey. Following trial, the District Court entered 
judgment in favor of Hulsey and against Washington Federal. Both Washington Federal and Hulsey 
requested an award of attorney fees. The District Court denied both requests. Washington Federal 
appealed from the District Court's Order and Judgment denying Washington Federal's request for 
an award of fees. Hulsey filed a cross-appeal. Hulsey' s original argument in support of his cross-· 
appeal was set forth in his Respondents' Brief (filed with this Court on November 10, 2016) at 
Sections IV.C and E (pp. 36-39 and 41 ). This Brief constitutes Hulsey's Reply Brief in support of 
his cross-appeal. Hulsey asserts that the District Court erred in denying his request for an award of 
attorney fees as the prevailing party in proceedings related to Washington Federal' s claim for entry 
of a deficiency judgment. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
Pursuant to the terms of a stipulated Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure (prepared by 
Washington Federal), trial was had before the District Court on "the sole remaining issue after 
Sheriffs Sale of the fair market value of the [ foreclosed upon] property as of the date of the 
foreclosure sale .... " R., Vol. 3, pp. 736-42. Following trial, another Final Judgment was entered, 
1 
this one in favor of Respondents/Cross-Appellants Michael R. Hulsey and SM Commercial 
Properties, LLC (who are collectively referred to in this Brief as "Hulsey") and against Washington 
Federal. R., Vol. 7, pp. 1751-52. The District Court held that Washington Federal had "failed to 
meet its burden of proof to establish either the fair market value of the subject property on March 
5, 2015 or the existence of a deficiency." R., Vol. 6, p. 1477; Vol. 7, pp. 1751-52. 
Washington Federal and Hulsey both timely requested that the District Court award them 
attorney fees and costs incurred in proceedings following entry of the August 18, 2014 stipulated 
Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. Washington Federal based its request for fees and costs on 
a breach of contract claim, relying upon the terms of the underlying Promissory Note and Deed of 
Trust. R., Vol. 6, pp. 1479-80.1 Hulsey requested an award of attorney fees pursuant to l.C. § 12-
120(3), as the prevailing party in the deficiency judgment action. R, Vol. 7, pp. 1510A. 
The District Court denied both parties' requests. R., Vol. 7, pp. 1715-23; 1754-56. Since 
Washington Federal had already filed a Notice of Appeal from the District Court's Final Judgment 
denying Washington Federal relief on its claim for a deficiency judgment, Hulsey' s appeal from the 
District Court's denial of his request for an award of attorney fees and costs was in the nature of a 
cross-appeal. In his initial Respondent's brief filed with this Court on November 10, 2016, Hulsey 
incorporated argument in support of his cross-appeal at Sections IV.C and E (pp. 36-39 and 41). 
Washington Federal requested an award of costs and attorney fees "pursuant to Rule 
54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, the parties' Promissory Note, Deed of Trust, and related 
loan documentation." R., Vol. 7, p. 1480. 
2 
This Brief is submitted by way of reply in support of Hulsey' s cross-appeal. Hulsey respectfully 
urges this Court to find that the District Court erred in denying Hulsey's request for an award of 
attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party in the deficiency judgment action. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
Hulsey previously set forth his "Statement of Facts" at Section LC. of his Respondents' Brief 
(filed with this Court on November 10, 2016). Said "Statement ofFacts" is incorporated herein and 
will not be repeated 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED IN HULSEY'S CROSS-APPEAL. 
1. Whether the District Court erred in denying Hulsey' s request for an award 
of the attorney fees and costs he incurred in the deficiency judgment action 
following entry of the stipulated Judgment and Decree ofForeclosure?2 
2. Whether Hulsey is entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs incurred on 
appeal?' 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Hulsey's cross-appeal seeks a reversal of the District Court's Order and Judgment denying 
Hulsey' s request for an award of attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party in the deficiency 
judgment action. The appropriate standard of review was set forth by this Court in Contreras v. 
Rubley; 142 Idaho 573, 130 P.3d 1111 (2006): 
2 This issue was originally stated as issue No. 5 at Section II (p. 11) of Hulsey's 
Respondents' Brief(filed with this Court on November 10, 2016). 
3 This issue was originally stated as issue No. 6 at Section II (p. 11) of Hulsey's 
Respondents' Brief(filed with this Court on November 10, 2016). 
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The District Court's decision to award attorney fees is a discretionary decision, 
subject to the abuse of discretion standard ofreview. To determine whether the trial 
court abused its discretion, this Court considers (1) whether the trial court correctly 
perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the 
outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable 
to the specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its 
decision by an exercise ofreason. 
When the award of attorney fees depends on the interpretation of a statute 
giving rise to that award, however, a different standard of review applies. The 
interpretation of a statute is a question of law over which this Court exercises free 
review. Whether the language of a statute is unambiguous, the plain meaning of the 
statute will govern and there is no need to consult extrinsic evidence. 
Contreras v. Rubley. 142 Idaho at 576 (citations omitted). In other words, if the District Court's 
decision to deny fees was predicated upon its interpretation of a statute or rule, this Court exercises 
free review over the District Court's decision. If the District Court's decision was not predicated 
upon interpretation of a statute or rule, then this Court reviews the District Court's decision under 
an abuse of discretion standard. 
IV. ARGUMENT. 
A. The Parties Sought Attorney Fees Under Wholly District Bases. 
In its Second Amended Complaint, Washington Federal asserted the following claims for 
relief: Claim 1 (requesting the appointment of a receiver) and Claim 2 (for judicial foreclosure). 
R., Vol. 2, pp. 316-49. Washington Federal further sough an award of attorney fees "pursuant to the 
loan documents," which were defined to include the Promissory Note (Exhibit D to the Second 
Amended Complaint) and the Deed of Trust (Exhibit C to the Second Amended Complaint). Id. at 
4 
p. 31. 
The Promissory Note, constituting a contract between Hulsey and Washington Federal, 
includes an attorney fee provision that provides: 
Lender may hire or pay someone else to help collect this Note if Borrower does not 
pay. Borrower will pay Lender that amount. This includes, subject to any limits 
applicable law, Lender's attorney's fees and Lender's legal expenses, whether or not 
there is a lawsuit, including attorney's fees, expenses for bankruptcy proceedings 
(including efforts to modify or vacate any automatic stay or injunction), and appeals. 
If not prohibited by applicable law, Borrower also will pay any court costs, in 
addition to all other sums provided by law. 
R., Vol. 2, pp. 355-56. The Deed of Trust also includes a contractual provision regarding 
Washington Federal's ability to seek attorney fees. R., Vol. II, p. 360. The bases for both claims lies 
in contract. 
Washington Federal acknowledged that its claim for attorney fees was predicated entirely 
upon this contractual claim. In Washington Federal's "Motion for Award of Attorneys' Fees and 
Costs," Washington Federal sought attorney fees "pursuant to Rule 54 of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the parties' Promissory Note, Deed of Trust and related loan documentation." R., Vol. 
6, p. 1480 (emphasis added).4 
4 One of many pro bl ems inherent with Washington Federal' s request for attorney fees 
was the fact that Washington Federal had not preserved a breach of contract claim for an award of 
attorney fees or costs. Pursuant to the term of the parties' stipulated Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure (entered August 18, 2014), the only claim preserved by Washington Federal was its 
claim for entry of a deficiency judgment. R., Vol. 3, p. 739. That stipulated Judgment, drafted by 
Washington Federal, provides: "That the Court specifically retains jurisdiction to determine the sole 
remaining issue after Sheriff Sale of the fair market value of the [ foreclosed upon] property as of the 
date of the foreclosure sale for the purpose of determining whether Plaintiff is entitled to entry of a 
5 
On the other hand, Hulsey' s claim for attorney fees, which is the subject of this cross-appeal, 
was made pursuant to LC. §12-120(3). In Hulsey's answer to Washington Federal's Second 
Amended Complaint, Hulsey affirmatively alleged that Washington Federal was "not entitled to any 
deficiency judgment," and sought an award of attorney fees under LC. §12-120(3). R., Vol. 2, p. 
417. · Hulsey sought an award of attorney fees in an action arising out of a commercial transaction. 
There can be no serious argrunent, on the part of Washington Federal, that its claim for a deficiency 
judgment was a claim in the nature of a "commercial transaction." In fact, in its Second Amended 
Complaint, Washington Federal itself claimed entitlementto an award offees under LC. § 12-120(3). 
R., Vol. 2, p. 346. 
B. Based Upon the Procedural Status of this Case, the District Court 
Abused its Discretion by Holding that Hulsey was not the Prevailing 
Party in the Deficiency Judgment Action. 
By stipulation of the parties, drafted Washington Federal, this action was bifurcated into two 
proceedings: (1) one which sought the appointment of a receiver and the entry of a decree of 
-
foreclosure; and (2) one which sought entry of a deficiency judgment A stipulated Judgment was 
entered in the first such proceeding, certified as final under IRCP 54(b), and no appeal was taken. 
The remaining proceeding involved solely Washington Federal's claim for entry of a deficiency 
deficiency judgment against Defendant Michael R. Hulsey." R., Vol. 3, p. 739 (emphasis added). 
That Judgment was certified as final (R., Vol. 3, p. 741), and no appeal was taken. By the clear 
language of the stipulated Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure, Washington Federal no longer had 
a breach of contract claim for an award of attorney fees or costs. In fact, the stipulated Judgment and 
Decree ofForeclosure specifically awarded Washington Federal its pre-deficiency judgment attorney 
fees of $66,183.95 together with expenses of foreclosure totaling $5,761.73. Id. at p. 737. 
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judgment. There is no dispute that Washington Federal prevailed on the first of the two proceedings. 
In fact, Hulsey stipulated to entry of an order appointing a receiver as well as entry of a Judgment 
and Decree of Foreclosure. Washington Federal was awarded the attorney fees it incurred in 
relationship to the receivership and foreclosure action, by stipulation, and Washington Federal took 
no appeal from that final Judgment. 
The sole relief sought by Washington Federal for entry of a deficiency judgment of some 
$700,000 was denied in its entirety. Under the unique procedural posture of this case, Hulsey 
respectfully submits the District Court abused its discretion by finding that Hulsey was not the 
prevailing party for purposes of the deficiency judgment action. 
This Court has held: 
[W]e agree with [the] argument that the determination of which party has prevailed 
is not a matter of mechanical measurement of the size of each party's respective 
recovery. Instead, the trial court should analyze each claim separately. Where both 
parties have successfully asserted claims, the claims should be severed and costs 
analyzed separately for each .... 
Ramco v. H-K Contractors, Inc., 118 Idaho 108, 113, 794 P.2d 1381 (1990). While Washington 
Federal makes much ado about the fact that the District Court granted W ashihgton Federal' s request 
for the appointment of a receiver and entered a decree of foreclosure, Washington Federal does not 
apprise this Court that both forms of relief were entered by stipulation. Moreover, Washington 
Federal did not apprise this Court that prior to entry of the stipulated Judgment and Decree of 
Foreclosure, and nearly a year and a half before the District Court entered Judgment denying 
7 
Washington Federal relief on its claim for a deficiency judgment, Hulsey offered to deed the property 
to Washington Federal in full satisfaction of its claim. R., Vol. 6, p. 1540A. 
Washington Federal' s assertion that no one prevailed in the deficiency action is disingenuous. 
Washington Federal argues that Hulsey commissioned an appraisal that inferred the existence of a 
deficiency. See Appellant's Brief at p. 43. Washington Federal does not apprise this Court that the 
basis for Washington Federal's claim was an exhibit that was not admitted at trial (Washington 
Federal's proposed Trial Exhibit No. 39). Essentially, Washington Federal lost at trial and now 
requests this Court's assistance based upon an exhibit neither received nor admitted at trial. The 
Court should not countenance such chicanery.5 
C. Hulsey is Entitled to An Award of Attorney Fees Incurred in the 
Successful Defense of the Deficiency Judgment Action Pursuant to this 
Court's Holding in Hoffer v. Shappard. 
On September 28, 2016, this Court entered its opinion in Hoffer v. Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 
380 P.3d 681 (2016). In the cited case, this Court held that an award of attorney fees would be 
prospectively appropriate, under LC. §12-121, in cases finally adjudicated after March 1, 2017, 
5 Washington Federal's misrepresentations regarding proceedings before the District 
Court, in the context ofHulsey's claim as the "prevailing party" in the deficiency judgment action, 
are not limited to Washington Federal's attempt to introduce evidence after judgment was entered. 
Washington Federal claims that Hulsey "contested the receivership," "refused to agree to 
foreclosure," and "contested summary judgment." See Washington Federal's opening Brief on 
appeal filed September 2, 2016 (at p. 42). The record wholly belies Washington Federal's claim. 
Washington Federal even suggests that Hulsey (as opposed to SM Commercial Properties, LLC) 
filed a "frivolous Chapter 11." Id. If the Chapter 11 was frivolous, why didn't Washington Federal 
request an award of attorney fees against SM Commercial Properties, LLC in proceedings before the 
United States Bankruptcy Court? 
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"when justice so requires." Hulsey respectfully submits, based on those reasons set forth in his 
Respondents' Brief and this Brief, that the District Court's Order denying his request for an award 
of attorney fees incurred in the successful defense of the deficiency judgment action be reversed and 
that he be awarded fees in the amount of$31,440. R., Vol. 6, pp. 1510-17. Washington Federal 
brought suit and Hulsey stipulated to Washington Federal's request for relief in the form of the 
appointment of a receiver and entry of a Judgment and Decree of Foreclosure. Hulsey appropriately 
opposed Washington Federal's sole remaining claim for entry of a deficiency judgment. Under the 
facts and circumstances, 'justice should require" that Hulsey be awarded the requested fees. The 
entire proceeding was unnecessary. Washington Federal refused to accept a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure and instead persisted in litigating for a year and a half without any positive outcome. 
D. Cross-Appellants Hulsey and SM Commercial Properties, LLC Request 
an Award of Attorney Fees and Costs on Appeal. 
Cross-Appellants Hulsey and SM Commercial Properties, LLC request an award of attorney 
fees on appeal, pursuant to LC. §§12-120(3) and IAR 41. As was also set forth in the Cross-
Appellants' Response Brief, said parties also request an award of fees pursuant to LC. §12-121 as 






Based upon the reasons and authorities set forth above, Cross-Appellants Michael R. Hulsey 
and SM Commercial Properties, LLC respectfully request that this Court reverse the District Court's 
Supplemental Judgment award Hulsey and SM Commercial Properties, LLC the sum of$31,440 in 
attorney fees incurred in their successful defense of the deficiency judgment claim, together with fees 
and costs incurred on aP.peal. 
iii 
Dated this/ 0 day of January, 2017. 
JO GNUSON 
ey or Respondents/Cross-
Mi R. Hulsey and 
SM Commercial Properties, LLC 
IO 
